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Abstract
This paper demonstrates that party-political orientations within governance com-
munities can have strong effects on policy implementation. Empirical evidence is
drawn from the Academy conversion scheme for secondary schools in England that
was recently pursued by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government.
The opt-in nature of the reform makes it possible to discern the impact that nominally
apolitical school governors have on the implementation of the policy. Academy con-
version is disproportionately found in more Conservative-voting constituencies due to
varying school-level propensities to apply to convert, rather than varying propensities
for the Department for Education to authorize conversions. Further, applications to
convert are significantly more likely from schools in Conservative parliamentary seats
that are under the control of Labour local authorities. Thus, nominally apolitical pol-
icy participants appear to act in rather political ways, which has implications for our
understanding of the involvement of civil society in the provision of public services.
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1 Introduction
A transformation in the governance structures of English education has been underway
since the coalition government came to power in May 2010. The previous model, in which
most schools were administered and controlled by a combination of Local Education Au-
thorities (LEAs), the national Department for Education (DfE), and local school manage-
ment, is in the process of being swept away under the auspices of a wholesale roll-out of the
‘Academies’ programme. Such a change is clearly of national political consequence, but the
core argument made here has more general theoretical importance. The claim is that re-
form of this sort is mediated through profoundly political factors at a much more local level
than is often considered. The empirical evidence below reveals that political factors have
been crucial in the roll-out of the policy at the level of individual schools. Further, these
school-level effects are large enough that they have created a sharp, national-level, asymme-
try between the prevailing models of schooling in Conservative and Labour constituencies.
The most local of politics can interact with ideological and political orientations to yield
national patterns of policy change.
Empirically focused on English schools, the methodological approach here takes advan-
tage of a rather distinctive feature of the Academy reform process in England to shed light
on whether, and with what consequences, unelected layers of governance structures act po-
litically. The opt-in nature of the reform meant that individual schools had discretion over
whether to adopt a rather important institutional reform that increased their own manage-
rial autonomy and, by implication, the between-school degree of competition. With school
governors commonly unelected and generally thought to be apolitical, one may reasonably
question whether we should expect variation in the adoption of this reform that can be
explained by political variables. I show below that the decisions of these actors reveal a
systematic political nature to school-level administration.
This finding has implications that are broader than simply for English schools. It sug-
gests that reforms that seek to disconnect policy implementation from political matters
may face a more difficult task than had been thought. It has natural implications for both
contemporary British politics and comparative patterns of public service provision. On
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the former, it seems natural to consider these findings in light of the push by the Con-
servatives to encourage a ‘Big Society’ approach to policy whereby civil society becomes
more involved in provision. Put simply: the results here suggest that political dimensions
may be relevant to this process, even at the notionally apolitical level of civil society orga-
nizations. The policy implementation literature (Matland 1995; Pressman and Wildavsky
1973; Saetren 2005; Schofield and Sausman 2004), even in its more recent consideration of
the possibility of the politicization of implementation (e.g. Kropf, Vercellotti, and Kimball
2013), has been rather quiet in this regard. Its prominent concern has been about the
extent to which local managers implement ‘authoritative decisions’ made at the centre,
but models employing local-opt-in mean that the issue is not whether the agents defect
from the central decision, but whether they embrace it. More comparatively, the theory
and results here point to the likelihood that those states that have long embedded civil so-
ciety organizations into structures of service provision — and the corporatist and Christian
Democratic welfare states are held to be prominent in this respect (Esping-Andersen 1989)
— will face politically-induced variation in this provision, even though electoral politics
operates at more of an arms-length.
The empirical focus of this paper affords it a place within the comparative education
policy literature that has studied the decentralizing and marketizing reforms to schooling
systems (e.g. West and Ylönen 2010; Whitty, Power, and Halpin 1998). It also contributes
to a literature that has sought to provide political explanations for patterns of reform
adoption in this sphere (e.g. Gingrich 2011; Hicks 2013b; Klitgaard 2008; Zehavi 2012). To
these studies of national-level policy choices, this paper adds a more nuanced understanding
of the way in which these policies can be mediated through local policy elites. Indeed,
outside the USA (e.g. Renzulli and Roscigno 2005; Vergari 2007), there is a dearth of
political science work that analyses the within-country political processes that are at work
when these reforms are implemented — and this has only very recently begun to be rectified
(e.g. Gingrich and Ansell 2013).
The underlying theoretical account of ideological politics at school level relates to wider
literatures, as well. For example, there has been work on the politics of administrative
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decentralization (e.g Christensen 2000; Christensen and Pallesen 2001; Green-Pedersen
2002), privatization (e.g. Boix 1997; Hicks 2013a; Zohlnhöfer, Obinger, and Wolf 2008), and
out-sourcing (e.g. Bhatti, Olsen, and Pedersen 2009; Chandler and Feuille 1991; Elinder and
Jordahl 2013; Picazo-Tadeo et al. 2012; Sundell and Lapuente 2012), but this has focused on
either parliamentary or local government politics without consideration of the politicization
of unelected actors. Meanwhile, there is a literature, focused on the USA, that more clearly
tackles this aspect by studying the policy effects of a ‘representative bureaucracy’ (e.g.
Bradbury and Kellough 2008; Meier and Bohte 2001; Meier and Nigro 1976), but this has
tended to focus on demographic rather than explicitly political representation (c.f. Kropf,
Vercellotti, and Kimball 2013). More broadly still, the findings presented below extend
a general partisanship literature that has repeatedly asked, ‘does politics matter?’. This
literature ranges from the classic comparative macroeconomic (e.g. Hibbs 1977), to national
education expenditure (Ansell 2010; Busemeyer 2007; Castles 1989; Iversen and Stephens
2008), and down to the level of local government (Boyne et al. 2012; Gerber and Hopkins
2011). In one sense, this paper provides an illustration of the connection between national
and local politics. Local political factors are clearly seen to be drivers for the embrace or
rejection of the Academy policy by individual schools, but they are only really explicable
within the context of a national-level understanding of the policy as a whole; be that
ideological or electoral.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. I begin by setting out the Academy
policy in more detail, before outlining a theoretical framework that draws on this discussion
to yield hypotheses about why we should expect some schools to be more likely to convert
than others. I then move to the empirical analysis, describing my data, showing visually
and statistically that there is a strong correlation between Academy conversion and the
party-political climate within a school’s constituency, and that this is driven by applications
to convert rather than subsequent bias in authorisations to convert.
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2 The Academy Programme
The Academy model of school decentralizes control of a whole range of consequential
features of educational provision to the school level — including curriculum design, staff
employment, capital expenditure, and even, to an extent, pupil admissions policies. In
effect, LEAs are being removed from the system of school governance, with a far greater
role being taken up by local school management, as well as the DfE. Indeed, the component
of the DfE bureaucracy dealing with Academies has quickly expanded to be the largest part
of the Department (Morris 2012). Where schools used to be operated in groups determined
by local political boundaries under the LEAs, the new model is dominated by single free-
standing schools as well as an emerging pattern of chains and federations of operators based
on shared approaches to the provision of schooling rather than just geography.
One factor that has clouded consideration of the politics of the Academy programme
is that it is composed of two superficially similar but ultimately distinct policies: one cre-
ated by the Labour government in the early 2000s and a second instituted by the current
coalition government in 2010. While the focus of this paper is on the latter, it is helpful
to provide a little context on the former. The Labour government introduced the term
‘Academy’ as the label for its approach of replacing under-performing schools (Adonis
2012). These Labour Academies were disproportionately targeted at poorer neighbour-
hoods where the need for reform was most apparent. They came with large-scale capital
investment from central government, greater freedoms for school management in the areas
of curriculum, staffing, and enrolment, and the requirement that an outside ‘sponsor’ be
enlisted to drive through improvements in the new schools. Sponsors were sought from
the private sector, including successful local businesses or even individual businessmen. In
addition to capital funding, on-going funding also came directly from central government,
leaving these ‘sponsor-led’ Academies almost completely separated from the LEAs that
had controlled the schools they replaced. An important consequence of this divorce from
LEAs was that Academies no longer had automatic access to the various services that those
bodies traditionally provided. Given that, freedom from LEAs came with the requirement
to provide, or purchase, services relating to various kinds of educational provision (e.g.
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special educational needs) and back office functions (e.g. human resources, finances, and
staff training).
It is important to note that there was a clear limit placed on the roll-out of this Labour
Academy scheme in the sense that it was targeted, and consequently that it had a very
redistributive character. The regulatory and management freedoms that came with this
new Academy status — including the ability to opt out of nationally-bargained wage and
employment agreements — were part of a political device that enabled Labour to avoid the
charge that it was simply sinking money into failing institutions. As such, while Labour
introduced the concept of Academies, together with their freedom from LEAs and greater
school-level management discretion, they were not intended to form the basis of a system-
level transformation in the governance and structure of English schooling.
When the coalition government came to power in May 2010, the new (Conservative)
Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove, quickly set about dramatically expanding
the scope of this existing sponsor-led Academy scheme. Amidst some fears of undue haste,
the Academies Act 2010 was passed in June 2010, coming into effect as early as the coming
school year starting in September 2010. The express intention of this Act was to facilitate
the conversion of as many existing ‘maintained’ (i.e. state-funded) schools to Academy
status as was feasible, with or without a sponsor. While Ed Balls, when Labour’s Secretary
of State for Education, did approve the conversion of a handful of maintained schools to
Academy status in 2009, it is a reasonable short-hand to denote ‘sponsor-led’ Academies as
being ‘Labour Academies’ and ‘converter’ Academies as being ‘Conservative Academies’.
The short-hand is useful, not least because it reinforces the fact that the sponsor-led
Academies that opened after the coalition government came to power were in fact the
fruits of the previous government’s efforts. The freedoms enjoyed by Academies under the
new government were essentially unchanged. As such, the new policy was a clear attempt
to fundamentally change the way in which much, if not all, of the English schooling system
operated. In these terms, at least, the policy has been rather an astounding success. By
2012, the proportion of secondary pupils being taught in an Academy school had jumped
to almost 40%, of which the nearly decade-old sponsor-led Academy scheme accounted for
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less than a quarter.
The conversion process warrants some attention as its features will form an important
justification for some of the inferences that I draw from the analysis that follows. The
process can reasonably be described as follows:
1. The school governors decide to request conversion to Academy status.
2. The DfE considers the request and decides whether, in principle, to approve conver-
sion.
3. If approval to convert is given, in principle, negotiations occur:
(a) between the school and the DfE regarding ongoing funding arrangements;
(b) between the school and the LEA regarding the transfer of assets and liabilities
from the LEA to the school.
4. With those negotiations successfully concluded, conversion to Academy status occurs.
Note that this process has some important aspects to it. First, the conversion process
must be initiated by schools themselves making a request to the DfE.This is important
for my broader theoretical purposes as data capturing this opt-in feature makes it possible
to observe something akin to policy preferences of nominally apolitical school governors.
Second, the DfE maintains veto power over which schools convert. Third, LEAs have
a relatively small formal role to play in the conversion process, being involved only in
the ‘nuts and bolts’ of asset transfers rather than the actual conversion decision itself.
Nonetheless, it remains an empirical question as to whether even this role affords them
the opportunity to influence conversion process outcomes. The empirical analysis below
engages directly with this question.
One aspect of the DfE’s assessment of a school’s conversion request is clearly based on
OFSTED reports for the schools that apply. These reports provide ratings for schools on
a 4-point scale from ‘Outstanding’ to ‘Inadequate’, and is applied to the school overall as
well as to different sub-categories of assessment, such as academic performance, leadership,
teaching effectiveness, etc. In the earliest stages of the conversion policy, it was announced
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that those schools with an ‘Outstanding’ OFSTED rating would be effectively pre-approved
for conversion. This was later relaxed to those schools with a ‘Good, with Outstanding
features’ rating. Interestingly, the DfE actively contacted such highly-rated schools at
the outset of the conversion policy to encourage them to convert. Thus, while schools
themselves were required to formally start the conversion process, the DfE was clearly not
an idle bystander waiting for applications to arrive.
The rapid rate of Academy conversion since 2010 prompts the question that drives the
empirical portion of this paper: why do some schools convert and others do not? While I
will return to the possible political reasons in the next section, it is helpful to understand
the scheme at a more bureaucratic level. Specifically, two prime candidate explanations
for why a school would convert are (1) the freedoms afforded to its management, and (2)
any associated financial incentives. In fact, the features of the former are effectively set in
law and so apply universally to any Academy. That does not mean that each school would
necessarily face the same pattern of management freedom incentives to convert, however.
Academy status results in the need for individual schools to procure a variety of services
that were previously provided by LEAs. Schools that feel they lack sufficient management
expertise or resources — perhaps because of their smaller size or greater specialist needs
resulting from characteristics of the student body — may be wary of conversion. I return
to this empirically below. Meanwhile, the financial side is less clear cut at this stage. Each
school converting to Academy status enters into its own separate funding agreement with
the DfE and systematic data are not yet available regarding these agreements, at least in
a form that is comparable with non-converters.
3 Theory
While there are administrative reasons to believe that there will be variation in the propen-
sity of different schools to convert to Academy status, the more theoretically interesting
reasons, for my purposes, relate more directly to politics. Even setting aside the simple
fact that it has the prospect of fundamentally re-orienting the governance structures of one
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of the largest public services, the Academy conversion scheme is clearly of great political
importance. This is true in several different senses. First, the coalition government ac-
corded it almost instantaneous legislative time upon assuming office, indicating that this
was a policy that had a great deal of backing at the very highest levels of the government.
Second, perhaps unsurprisingly given its scope, the policy has proved to be extremely con-
troversial amongst organized interests within the schools sector — most notably teachers’
unions. Leaders of several such bodies have been outspoken critics of the policy, and vari-
ous schools seeking to convert have faced strikes by staff opposed to the change. Third, the
policy has become fairly publicly associated with the Conservative Party, and Michael Gove
in particular — an association that he seems to embrace. I argue that this politicization
frames much of the policy process.
To provide some order to this category of politically-based variation in Academy con-
version, it is helpful to split the process into the application side (from schools) and au-
thorization side (from the DfE). This is helpful both in a conceptual way, but also because
it maps onto the process, outlined above, through which Academy conversion occurs. The
application side is of more relevance for consideration of the political behaviour of un-
elected local policy elites, but the authorization side also has the potential to shed light on
a substantively interesting aspect of the national politics of this particular policy reform.
On the application side, political ideology may be a driver for school governors, and
even the senior leadership team of schools. The Academy policy constitutes a reduction in
the level of control and regulation imposed on schools from higher levels of government,
both in the form of the LEA and central government. As such, it affords schools greater
freedom in their operation. This stepping-back of the state fits rather well with common
ideological conceptions of left and right, and so seems more likely to be supported by those
with other more rightist views (e.g. Boix 1997; Elinder and Jordahl 2013; Pierson 1998;
Zehavi 2012). Ideally, there would be survey data available on the ideological views of school
governors, which could then be assessed for its correlation with school conversions — an
approach that would be analogous to the ‘active bureaucratic representation’ research that
has been focused on the USA (e.g. Bradbury and Kellough 2008; Meier and Bohte 2001).
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Unfortunately, such data are not available. The closest data on governors’ views comes
from James et al. (2012), but their large survey of governors does not seem to have asked
questions about ideological or political attitudes.
The alternative approach that I adopt is to assume that, on average, school governors
are drawn from a pool of people that is reasonably representative of local political dispo-
sitions. It is fair to note that the assumption that underpins this is not unproblematic.
School governors are hardly a randomly-drawn sample from the local population, being
both selected and self-selecting, to varying degrees. Nonetheless, I maintain that the as-
sumption is not so problematic as not to be useful. It seems plausible to believe that
the political orientation of the local population from which governors are drawn will be
positively correlated, albeit imperfectly, with the political orientation of those governors.
Practically, I propose to measure the political orientation of the local population using vote
shares for the Westminster constituency that each school is located in. The intention is
to capture the political orientation of the population that has an interest in each school.
Defining this population at the LEA level implies an average of 17 schools for each LEA lo-
cality, but this certainly seems too high to be appropriate. The Westminster constituency
implies a more appropriate average of about five schools for each locality, which surely
better reflects the selection of schools that will be of interest to the population. Of course,
even if one accepts this view, a measure of political orientation based on constituency is
not without problems. For example, those who are near the border of the constituency
may not necessarily see all of the schools in that unit as their ‘local’ schools, being drawn
instead to those in other constituencies.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the use of parliamentary constituency to measure po-
litical orientation has the merit of facilitating any analysis of this issue, at all. While it is
certainly imperfect, there is no reason to think that measures derived from this geograph-
ical unit will bias the empirical results in favour of the theory. In fact, the opposite is
true as the associated measurement error should result in attenuation bias that makes the
test of the hypothesis more stringent than it should be. Thus, I maintain the assumption
that schools in constituencies voting disproportionately for Conservatives are also more
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likely to have ideologically Conservative school governors. In such circumstances, I argue
that we should expect a greater tendency to apply for Academy conversion. This proxy
for local ideological leanings can be made into a continuous measure by calculating the
Conservative-minus-Labour vote share for each constituency at the 2010 general election.
On this basis, the ideological argument leads to a prediction of a fairly smooth relationship
between Conservative-minus-Labour constituency vote share and the likelihood of a school
applying for conversion.
Hypothesis 1 The probability of a school applying to convert to Academy status will be
an increasing function of the difference between the constituency-level Conservative and
Labour vote shares.
Coupled with the institutional structure within which schools operate, this initial hy-
pothesis points towards a further possibility. Conversion to Academy status is about greater
freedoms for schools, but a potentially important aspect of this is from whom these free-
doms are gained. In this light, to the extent that ideological views on the appropriate
way to operate schools, the political orientation of the LEA is likely to be consequential
to the decision to apply for conversion. Schools in localities (i.e constituencies) that share
a political orientation with the LEA that controls them are less likely to find the LEA
to be burdensome or restrictive. Put more concretely, schools in strongly Conservative
seats would seem more likely to clash with a Labour-controlled LEA than a Conservative-
controlled LEA. Indeed, this is consistent with the recent finding by Andrews et al. (2012)
that public service performance is negatively affected by differences in the ‘strategic stances’
of different organizational levels. There are 150 LEAs in my sample and 530 constituencies,
so there is ample scope for mismatches of control and political orientation. Given this, I
suggest the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 The probability of a school applying to convert to Academy status will be
an increasing function of the difference between the constituency-level Conservative and
Labour vote shares, and this effect will be stronger where there is a mismatch between
constituency-level political and LEA political orientation.
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On the authorization side, there is a related set of possible political mechanisms in
play. Note, however, that the Academy conversion process means that, in a formal sense,
the DfE cannot compel conversion. Thus, its approval of conversion is contingent on the
applications that it receives. With that said, the DfE has been working to encourage
conversion requests in the first place by sending letters and then representatives out to
schools to discuss the possibilities with them. Indeed, these efforts have led to conflict
with LEA leaders, one of whom publicly requested that such visits be halted (BBC News
2013).
There is obviously reason to think that the political motives behind the policy at
large will lead the DfE to wish to see schools convert to Academy status. The relevant
question, however, is what reasons there might be to think that this desire will manifest
itself differentially across schools. One possibility is that Academy conversion is deemed by
the political leadership of the DfE to be an electoral asset to sitting MPs. In principle, this
could be the result of an opportunity to offer favourable financial terms to such converting
schools — although as noted above, there is little evidence to suggest that is the case.
An alternative is that it is the result of an ideological belief that the Academy model
is the more desirable for the provision of public education in terms of student outcomes
and satisfaction. Either way, there could be an incentive for authorizations to be skewed
towards schools in government-held constituencies. This leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 Conditional on having applied to convert to Academy status, the probability
of a school being authorized to do so will be higher in government-held than Labour-held
constituencies.
A second possibility is that the political leadership at the DfE will seek to maximize
Academy conversion in the most electorally marginal constituencies. The logic is similar to
that above, but this time draws on an application of classic pursuit of the ‘median voter’
(Downs 1957), or Director’s Law (Stigler 1970). Assuming that Academy conversion is
thought to be inherently beneficial to a school (and its surrounding area), an office-seeking
politician will have an incentive to target the Academy conversion policy in marginal con-
stituencies to increase their party’s vote share there. This argument applies fairly equally to
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marginal seats held by Conservatives (and Liberal Democrats) or opposition parties to the
extent that all such seats exhibit a similar probability of Conservative (or Liberal Demo-
crat) victory in the subsequent election. Certainly in the current climate of macro-economic
difficulties, government MPs cannot feel confident of re-election in marginal seats.
Hypothesis 4 Conditional on having applied to convert to Academy status, the probabil-
ity of a school being authorized to do so will be higher in the most electorally marginal
constituencies than it is in the more electorally secure constituencies.
Finally, moving beyond considerations relating to the DfE, the conversion process out-
lined above indicates that there is a potential point of influence for LEAs. While they
do not have a direct role on the application side — except to the extent that they have
influence over boards of governors — they are party to negotiations over how assets and
liabilities are transferred from the LEA to any converting school. Given this, they may
have the opportunity to hold up or expedite conversion, depending on their policy prefer-
ences. This suggests a hypothesis that relates the partisan control of an LEA to conversion
probability.
Hypothesis 5 The conversion process is less likely to be completed where schools must
negotiate asset arrangements with Labour-controlled LEAs.
4 The Data
I test the hypotheses developed above using a constructed data set containing information
on all secondary schools in England. I concentrate on secondary schools as this has largely
been the focus of the Academy conversion policy. Primary schools have started converting,
but in much lower numbers and there is generally less experience of the scheme at this
level.
The basis of the data set is the DfE spreadsheet released as part of “Schools, Pupils
and their Characteristics: January 2013” (Department for Education 2013). This contains
information on all maintained schools in England, with columns indicating the type of
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school (i.e. converter Academy, sponsor-led Academy, Community School, etc), as well as
enrollment size and free school meal proportion. The latter is the standard measure for
capturing social disadvantage of the student body. Note that the information is based on
administrative records, and is correct as at January 2013.
I merge this baseline data set with data on the most recent OFSTED inspection reports
(up to 2010) for nearly all schools in the sample — as used by Allen and Burgess (2012).
I merge the combined school-level data with the 2010 constituency-level general election
results provided by Norris (2010). Finally, I merge these data with local election results up
to 2010, as made available by the project coordinated by Rallings and Thrasher (1997).
This allowed me to construct variables that capture that partisan control of each LEA in
2010.
Together, this constructed data set yields a sample of 3089 secondary schools in Eng-
land. I then restrict the sample to those that are not sponsor-led Academies as my interest
is in those that were, in principle, able to convert to this status from 2010 onwards. I
further discard the 28 schools that cannot be matched to an OFSTED rating. This yields
a sample of 2681 schools, 1130 of which had converted by January 2013. Lest there be any
doubt about the size of the Academy conversion programme, these figures make clear that
it involved around 30% of secondary schools in only its second academic year of operation.
As a final step, I merge in DfE data made available by Rogers (2010) on those schools
that had expressed an interest to the DfE in converting to Academy status up to around
mid-July 2010. Note that this is not the same as a formal application to convert, but it
does capture an important aspect of the application side that would otherwise be rather
opaque. While it might appear unfortunate that these data are currently only available
for such an early point in the policy process — around one month after the passage of the
Academies Act 2010 — this turns out not to be an important empirical problem. It is not
the case that only very few schools had time to express their interest in conversion by this
point: 931 had done so. Given this, it is reasonable to conclude that the early-interest list
captures the degree of school demand for conversion in a reasonable way. This is important
because the use of these data allows me to try to disentangle some of the application and
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authorization effects that underlie the hypotheses developed above.
5 The Political Distribution of Converter Academies
I begin the analysis with a graphical exploration of the patterns of interest in and conversion
to Academy status, which I then supplement with a more systematic multivariate analysis.
The prediction from hypothesis 1 is that schools will be more likely to apply for conversion
when they are located in more strongly Conservative constituencies. To assess whether this
is the case, figure 1 shows the proportion of schools that expressed an interest in converting
against the difference between the Conservative and Labour vote shares for the relevant
constituencies in 2010. The underlaid histogram shows the number of schools that fall
within each ‘bin’ in order to make clear which parts of the scatter plot are drawn from
smaller amounts of data. The figure lends rather strong support to the hypothesis as,
notwithstanding some noise to the relationship, conversion interest is clearly increasing in
Conservative vote share.
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FIGURE 1 Proportion of schools expressing an interesting in converting to academy status
(July 2010), by relative Conservative constituency-level electoral strength in 2010.
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Hypothesis 3, regarding the likelihood of authorisation to convert, can be assessed in
a similar way. Figure 2 plots the proportion of schools that had converted by January
2013, conditional on having expressed an interest in July 2010, against the Conservative–
Labour vote share. There is no evidence in this figure that conversions in Labour seats
have occurred at a lower rate than in Conservative seats. Rather, the vast majority of
schools expressing an interest in 2010 have subsequently converted, no matter what the
partisan complexion of their locality. Indeed, the underlying data indicate that of the 918
schools in the sample that expressed an interest, 860 had converted by January 2013.
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FIGURE 2 Proportion of schools expressing an interest in Academy conversion (July
2010) that subsequently converted (January 2013), by relative Conservative constituency-
level electoral strength in 2010.
Figure 3 shows the equivalent data for all conversions, regardless of whether the school
expressed an interest in July 2010 or not. It confirms patterns suggested by the previous
two figures of more conversions in more Conservative constituencies. From these data,
a basic pattern is clearly visible: Academy conversion has occurred disproportionately in
Conservative seats.
This pattern of greater conversion rates in Conservative constituencies may seem un-
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FIGURE 3 Proportion of schools converting to academy status (January 2013), by relative
Conservative constituency-level electoral strength in 2010.
surprising given that the rules governing conversion were written such that more successful
schools — in terms of OFSTED inspection reports — were more likely to be approved for
the transition. That is, if more successful schools are more prevalent in wealthier areas
and those areas disproportionately vote Conservative, then this could explain the pattern.
However, data from OFSTED inspections do not lend support for this view. Figure 4 plots
average OFSTED ‘overall’ inspection results (on a scale where ‘Outstanding’ corresponds
to 4 and ‘Inadequate’ corresponds to 1) against the Conservative–Labour vote share, and
reveals that there are not systematically higher results in Conservative constituencies. As
such, there is little reason to think that the disproportionate conversion in more strongly
Conservative areas is driven by school quality.
6 Explaining Interest in Academy Conversion
I now turn to a series of logit models to test hypotheses 1 and 3 more systematically.
From the administrative records, I use data on pupil numbers and the FSM proportion of
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FIGURE 4 Average OFSTED ‘overall’ inspection rating, by relative Conservative electoral
strength at the constituency level in 2010.
enrolled pupils. As OFSTED school inspection reports were used to (partially) indicate
which schools would be allowed to convert, I use these data, as well. Finally, to test the
two hypotheses directly, I use data on the Conservative vote share margin over Labour in
the constituency of each school (for hypothesis 1), as well as dummy variables for the party
of the sitting MP after 2010 (for hypothesis 3). I divide Con–Lab vote share variable by
100 and the Pupils variable by 1000 so that the respective estimated coefficients require
few decimal places for presentation.
Table 1 presents the results of estimating models that focus on a test of hypothesis 1.
Model 1 shows the estimates of a standard logit model where expression of interest in
Academy conversion is the dependent variable. Model 2 re-estimates the same specifica-
tion, but this time including random effects at the LEA level. The logic for doing this is
that individual LEAs may have an impact on whether schools express an interest, either
through the presence of their representatives on boards of governors, or through persua-
sion or coercion of a less formal kind. Estimating LEA-level random effects allows for
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1 2 3 4 5
(Intercept) −2.48∗∗∗ −2.85∗∗∗ −2.63∗∗∗ −2.62∗∗∗ −1.77∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.47) (0.45) (0.45) (0.59)
Pupils 0.72∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15)
FSM −2.64∗∗∗ −2.74∗∗∗ −2.49∗∗∗ −2.54∗∗∗ −2.84∗∗∗
(0.59) (0.70) (0.60) (0.61) (0.71)
OFSTED: Satisfactory 0.51 0.50 0.55 0.55 0.50
(0.39) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42)
OFSTED: Good 1.28∗∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.42) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41)
OFSTED: Outstanding 2.25∗∗∗ 2.47∗∗∗ 2.31∗∗∗ 2.32∗∗∗ 2.50∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.43) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42)
Con-Lab 1.34∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.32) (0.27) (0.29) (0.41)
LEA: Lab −0.03 0.26
(0.17) (0.21)
LEA: Con 0.07 0.12
(0.14) (0.14)
LEA: LD 0.15 0.18
(0.33) (0.33)
(Con-Lab) × (LEA: Lab) 1.74∗∗
(0.79)
Managerial Population −4.54∗∗∗
(1.60)
AIC 2883.35 2687.12 2798.48 2795.51 2681.06
BIC 2924.33 2733.97 2856.75 2859.60 2733.76
Log Likelihood -1434.67 -1335.56 -1389.24 -1386.75 -1331.53
Deviance 2869.35 2671.12 2778.48 2773.51 2663.06
N: obs 2579 2579 2506 2506 2579
N: LEA 150 150
Variance: LEA 1.19 1.14
Variance: Residual 1.00 1.00
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
TABLE 1 Estimated effects, based on logit models, on the probability of a school expressing
an interest in Academy conversion.
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these unobserved factors to be controlled for across the 150 LEAs in the sample. The esti-
mates and inferences from both of these models are very much in line, however, suggesting
that LEA-level factors are not of great importance in explaining school conversion interest.
This inference is reinforced by the results from model 3, which includes dummy variables
indicating whether the LEA is controlled by Conservative, Labour, or Liberal Democrat
councillors — using ‘No overall control’ is the base category.
Regarding the more administrative variables, larger schools are more likely to have
been interested, as are schools with lower FSM proportions. These results are intuitive.
Larger schools are more likely to have the capacity to take on administrative functions
that were previously provided by LEAs. Similarly, lower FSM proportions are likely to
be strongly correlated with lower use of special educational services that LEAs typically
provide; thus making separation from those bodies less costly and disruptive. Looking at
the OFSTED report results, there are, again, few surprises. ‘Outstanding’ schools are more
likely to have expressed an interest in conversion; fitting with the publicized position of
the DfE regarding their eligibility. Naturally enough, the likelihood of expressing interest
is estimated to decline monotonically with the OFSTED rating.
These control variables all perform rather well, but the more theoretically interesting
results are for the remaining variables. For the Conservative–Labour vote share variable,
the estimated coefficient across all models is positive, fairly precisely estimated, and sta-
ble. As such, there is strong evidence in support of hypothesis 1. Model 3 provides no
evidence that partisan control of LEAs had a direct influence on expressions of interest in
Academy conversion. However, model 4 introduces an interaction variable that is used to
test hypothesis 2 — relating to the idea that schools in a more Conservative constituency
but under the control of a Labour LEA will be more likely to wish to convert. This hy-
pothesis does indeed find support as the coefficient on the Conservative–Labour vote share
difference is estimated to be almost three times as large for schools operating under Labour
LEAs. Note that this also implies that schools in more strongly Labour-voting seats are
much less likely to seek to convert when controlled by a Labour LEA.
As a final robustness test, model 5 re-estimates the model 2 specification, but with an
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additional control variable included. One reasonable concern is that it may not be the
ideological orientation of a school’s surrounding constituency that is driving its propensity
to seek to convert, but rather the socio-economic standing and therefore capabilities of
the parents and governors. That is to say, conversion to Academy status may be seen
to imply greater managerial responsibilities for school governors, and those with less ex-
perience in this realm may prefer to retain the support afforded by LEA control. This
issue may confound the inferences regarding Conservative–Labour vote share if parent and
governor capabilities are correlated with patterns of voting — which seems all too plausi-
ble as the Conservatives are typically thought to represent the higher-income sections of
society. In order to assess whether this socio-economic capabilities mechanism is operat-
ing instead of the more directly political, model 5 includes a variable that measures the
fraction of the constituency population that falls into any of the following three National
Statistics Socio-Economic classifications (as provided by Norris (2010)): ‘Higher manage-
rial and professional occupations’; ‘Lower managerial and professional occupations’, and;
‘Small employers and own account workers’. This yields a variable that I denote as ‘Man-
agerial Population’, and which has a sample mean and standard deviation of 0.25 and
0.06, respectively. Thus, it captures a meaningfully large proportion of the population
that plausibly has the experience to take on extra managerial responsibilities in schools.
The results show that the inference on the Conservative–Labour vote share variable is ro-
bust to the inclusion of this managerial population variable. Indeed, the magnitude of the
vote share coefficient actually doubles with its inclusion and the managerial coefficient is
actually negative. Unreported specifications confirm that this negative sign is true in a
partial-correlation sense as excluding Con–Lab switches its sign, albeit without achieving
statistical significance. Moreover, the inference regarding hypothesis 2 is also robust to the
inclusion of Managerial Population.
While inferences from the coefficient estimates are valuable, they can become clearer
when translated into something more substantive (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).
To that end, I use figure 5 to show how, on the basis of the results from model 1, the
predicted probability of Academy-interest varies with the Conservative–Labour vote share
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variable. The figure is probabilities and confidence intervals are depicted separately for
each of the OFSTED rating categories, with the other predictors are held at their sample-
mean values for this purpose. It illustrates how, in the most Conservative constituencies,
Academy-interest probability is around twice as high as it is in the least Conservative
constituencies. Given an OFSTED rating of ‘Outstanding’, a school in the strongest Labour
constituency had around a 1-in-3 chance of expressing interest, while such a school in the
strongest Conservative seat had around a 2-in-3 chance. Furthermore, the precision of
these estimated probabilities allows the model to distinguish between the effects of vote
share differences of much smaller magnitudes than the entire sample range. In sum, the
estimated effects both support hypothesis 1, and do so in a way that demonstrates a large
substantive effect from this political variable. Interest in Academy conversion amongst
schools is strongly correlated with local Conservative electoral strength.
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FIGURE 5 Predicted probability of schools expressing interest in Academy conversion as
a function of the Conservative–Labour vote share, for each of ‘Outstanding’, ‘Good’, and
‘Satisfactory’ OFSTED ratings. 90% confidence intervals shown in transparent colours.
Other predictors held at their sample means.
This inference is reinforced by figure 6, which is analogous to figure 5, but depicts
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the results from model 4 and so how the constituency political orientation interacts with
LEA political control. As before, again pupil numbers and the FSM proportion are set
at their sample mean, and now the OFSTED rating is set to ‘Good’. The figure shows
that there is generally a positive relationship between Conservative–Labour vote share and
conversion interest, but that this relationship is much stronger for schools controlled by
Labour LEAs. In the most Labour-voting constituencies, Labour LEA control reduces
conversion interest as compared to other LEA partisanship, but in the most Conservative-
voting constituencies, it markedly increases it. As such, hypothesis 2 receives good support.
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FIGURE 6 Predicted probability (based on )of schools (rated ‘Good’ by OFSTED) express-
ing interest in Academy conversion as a function of the Conservative–Labour vote share,
conditional on being in a Labour-controlled LEA or not. 90% confidence intervals shown
in transparent colours. Other predictors held at their sample means.
7 Explaining Academy Conversion
If politics explains school-level interest in converting, does it also explain conversion itself?
I answer this question in two steps. First, I analyse the subsample of schools that expressed
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an interest in conversion back in July 2010 in order to isolate the DfE authorization side
of conversion from the schools’ application side. However, as the conversion process has
developed since 2010, there are many schools that are now Academies but did not initially
express an interest in converting. Given that, I conduct a second analysis of Academy con-
version amongst the full sample of schools in order to draw out the correlates of conversion
overall.
7.1 Conversion Amongst the ‘Interested’
Table 2 presents results from estimating models used to test hypothesis 3 regarding the
probability of conversion authorisation being higher, on average, in Conservative-held seats
than Labour-held seats, and hypothesis 4 regarding higher authorisation rates in marginal
constituencies. The dependent variable for these models is a dummy variable indicating
whether a school had converted by January 2013. As discussed above, the sample is limited
to those schools that had previously expressed interest. In principle, it may be desirable to
estimate Heckman selection models here as a way of accounting for the two-stage process
of schools applying (i.e. selecting-in) and the DfE authorising. However, this approach is
only appropriate when the estimated models in the two stages can be assumed to have a
least one different predictor from each other — or if the analyst is willing to make rather
strong assumptions about functional form. That is neither possible nor appropriate here,
unfortunately.
Model 6 is used to test hypothesis 3 by employing dummy variables for whether each
school is in a constituency held by a Conservative or Liberal Democrat MP. The OFSTED
dummies are reduced by one category as the inclusion of the eight ‘Unsatisfactory’ schools
in the sample leads to estimation problems for the remaining OFSTED coefficients. In
contrast to the hypothesis, there is no evidence that conversion occurred at a higher rate
amongst schools in such constituencies conditional on them having expressed an interest
in converting. Model 7 is used to test hypothesis 4. The ‘Marginal Constituency’ variable
is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Conservatives and Labour were the two
largest parties and their vote shares were within ±3 percentage points. Again, I find
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6 7 8 9
(Intercept) 0.97 1.36∗∗∗ 0.54 0.15
(0.66) (0.51) (0.60) (0.70)
Pupils 1.05∗∗ 1.02∗∗ 1.07∗∗ 1.02∗∗
(0.43) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42)
FSM −2.26 −3.08∗∗ −2.59∗ −2.23
(1.41) (1.21) (1.35) (1.43)
OFSTED: Good 0.71∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 0.76∗∗ 0.84∗∗
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
OFSTED: Outstanding 0.81∗∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.90∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39)
MP: Con 0.52 0.44
(0.36) (0.43)
MP: LD −0.07 0.17
(0.48) (0.51)
Marginal Constituency 1.16 1.50
(1.03) (1.06)
LEA: Lab 0.86∗ 1.08∗∗
(0.49) (0.51)
LEA: Con 0.87∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗
(0.33) (0.37)
LEA: LD 0.16 0.29
(0.80) (0.84)
AIC 414.66 413.92 405.20 406.94
BIC 453.11 447.56 443.30 459.33
Log Likelihood -199.33 -199.96 -194.60 -192.47
Deviance 398.66 399.92 389.20 384.94
N: obs 903 903 865 865
N: LEA 132 132
Variance: LEA 0.05 0.00
Variance: Residual 1.00 1.00
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
TABLE 2 Estimated effects, based on logit models, on the probability of Academy conver-
sion authorisation being granted, conditional on an expression of conversion interest being
received.
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no evidence to support the hypothesis regarding marginal constituencies, and unreported
results confirm that this inference is unchanged for a marginal band defined in the ranges
±2 up to ±4.5. While the coefficient has the correct sign and is larger than its standard
error, it does not meet conventional statistical significance levels.
Model 8 provides an assessment of hypothesis 5, regarding the importance of LEAs in
the conversion process. As described above, prospective converters must negotiate their
transition to independence with the LEA and it is possible for LEAs to exert some influence
on the process in this way. As before, dummies for LEA control are used, with ‘no overall
control’ (NOC) as the base category. The results do not show support for hypothesis 5.
Specifically, they indicate that schools under Conservative LEAs were more likely to convert
than those under NOC LEAs. Surprisingly, schools under Labour LEAs were also more
likely to convert than those under NOC LEAs. It is important to note that the results do
not indicate a different propensity to convert between Conservative and Labour LEAs, for
which the estimated coefficients are not statistically significantly different from each other.
Of course, all of these results are conditional on schools having expressed an interest in
converting in the first place. The Labour finding is intriguing, but without further data it
is difficult to discern what is causing it. One speculative possibility is that the DfE is more
likely to authorize conversion amongst schools operating under Labour LEAs as a way of
reducing influence of the Labour politicians on schools.
Finally, model 9 shows that the main inferences are robust to the estimation of a model
that tests all hypotheses simultaneously. It makes clear that the parameter estimates for
all variables are very stable across all specifications. In sum, looking at the controls, table 2
indicates that larger schools were more likely to convert and schools with a greater FSM
proportion were less likely to convert. Meanwhile, regarding the more political theories,
there is no evidence that the DfE favoured schools in government-held constituencies or
that it favoured schools in more marginal constituencies. There is, however, evidence that
it may have favoured schools operating under Conservative and Labour LEAs.
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7.2 Conversion Amongst All Schools
Table 3 presents results from estimating a series of models used to identify the predictors
of Academy conversion amongst all secondary schools in England. Model 10 is estimated
using the school-level administrative data, as well as the Conservative–Labour vote share
variable. This model replicates the Academy-interest findings in the sense that the vote
share difference is estimated as a strong predictor of Academy conversion. In model 11, the
LEA-control dummy variables are included. Once again, both Conservative and Labour
control of the LEA are estimated as statistically significant predictors of Academy conver-
sion compared to NOC-LEAs, but not different from each other. There appears to be an
interesting feature of NOC councils that leads to a lower level of Academy conversion, how-
ever the data used here do not provide a way of probing the mechanism that leads to this
outcome. Once the LEA dummies are included (in model 11), the estimated magnitude
of the vote share coefficient drops by about 35%, but does remain statistically significant.
This suggests that some of the effect of the vote share variable comes from its correlation
with LEA control, but clearly not all of it.
As with the conversion-interest results, it is helpful to illustrate the results of the
statistical models. In figure 7, I plot the predicted probability of a school converting against
the Conservative–Labour vote share, and do so separately for the top three OFSTED
ratings. Comparing this figure with figure 5, the results are rather similar. Note, however,
that for any given level of the vote share variable, the predicted probability of conversion
is around 5 percentage points higher than the predicted probability of a school simply
expressing an interest in conversion in 2010. This reflects the greater penetration of the
policy as the DfE has had more time to implement it in the following three years.
8 Conclusion
Analyzing a recent large-scale policy decision within the English schools system, I have
documented several consequential features of the ‘Academization’ of English schools being
undertaken by the current coalition government. Most fundamentally, I have shown that
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10 11
(Intercept) −1.82∗∗∗ −1.88∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.36)
Pupils 0.98∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.13)
FSM −3.77∗∗∗ −3.49∗∗∗
(0.68) (0.57)
OFSTED: Satisfactory 0.10 0.14
(0.33) (0.32)
OFSTED: Good 0.85∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗
(0.33) (0.31)
OFSTED: Outstanding 1.71∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.32)
Con-Lab 1.27∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.26)
LEA: Lab 0.35∗∗
(0.16)
LEA: Con 0.49∗∗∗
(0.13)
LEA: LD 0.52
(0.32)
AIC 2840.41 2980.10
BIC 2887.25 3038.37
Log Likelihood -1412.20 -1480.05
Deviance 2824.41 2960.10
N: obs 2579 2506
N: LEA 150
Variance: LEA 1.19
Variance: Residual 1.00
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
TABLE 3 Estimated effects, based on logit models, on the probability of Academy conver-
sion authorisation being granted, conditional on an expression of conversion interest being
received.
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FIGURE 7 Predicted probability of schools converting to Academy status as a function of
the Conservative–Labour vote share, for each of ‘Outstanding’, ‘Good’, and ‘Satisfactory’
OFSTED ratings. 90% confidence intervals shown in transparent colours. Figure drawn
based on a school under Conservative-controlled LEA and other predictors held at their
sample means.
there is a very marked political distribution of Academy conversion within the country,
such that schools in more strongly Conservative constituencies are around twice as likely to
convert than schools in more strongly Labour constituencies. This remains true even after
controlling for school quality and the social deprivation of pupils. As such, the Academy
conversion policy is one that has disproportionately influenced traditional Conservative
voters.
A second core finding is that this political distribution of Academy conversion is most
likely driven by the application side from schools, rather than the authorization side from
the DfE. That is to say, there is little evidence that the skew that makes schools in Con-
servative constituencies so much more likely to convert is the result of the DfE being more
likely to authorize conversion of ‘Conservative schools’, conditional on a school having ap-
plied to convert. One notable aspect of the application side is that schools in local areas
that are a political mismatch for their controlling LEA are even more likely to wish to
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convert to Academy status. There appears to be an important element of freeing some
schools from local political constraints in this policy. Thus, one inferentially valuable as-
pect of this finding is that it allows some degree of distinction between the importance of
simple ideological beliefs about the likely effectiveness of the Academy as an institution
for providing education, as compared to the more organizational-politics version of policy
clashes between school and LEA. While the former certainly cannot be ruled out generally,
it seems unlikely that it can be used to explain the political-mismatch finding. Whether the
DfE — or its political leadership — foresaw the differential demand across schools for con-
version, and so its ultimate political distribution, is not possible to discern from these data.
However, it is possible to be fairly confident that the device of effectively pre-approving
conversion by ‘Outstanding’ schools did not come with its own in-built political bias as the
distribution of OFSTED ratings is fairly uniform across constituencies, politically.
On the authorization side of the Academy conversion process, the evidence suggests
that the primary determinants of receiving authorization from the DfE are administrative
in nature. School size, social need, and OFSTED ratings are the strongest predictors of
authorization for those schools that, themselves, expressed an interest in converting. I find
no evidence that schools in Conservative or Liberal Democrat constituencies were favoured
for conversion, nor schools in marginal constituencies. Political control of LEAs appears
to play a role, but it is not possible to discern whether this is the result of choices by the
DfE or actions by the LEAs. Further research would be of value, here.
A core contribution of this paper is to highlight political features of the policy reform
process that reach far down the hierarchy of the education system. While previous work
has studied political aspects of education policy by focusing on the distinctive features of
national education policies (e.g. Exley and Ball 2011; Pierson 1998), the more disaggregated
approach taken here bears considerable fruit. On the theoretical side, it provides evidence
for the politicization of those not often considered to be political: unelected local elites. As
civil society becomes more involved in the provision of services, this finding would seem to
have important implications. On the diret empirical side, it reveals an emerging bifurcation
between the prevailing schooling model in Labour as opposed to Conservative (and Liberal
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Democrat) constituencies. In the former, around 25% of schools have converted to Academy
status while in the latter, it is around 50%.
While the English schooling system has long seen important local differences — such
as the variable adoption of the comprehensive model across LEAs — this discrepancy is
potentially rather important. There seems every possibility that it could lead to politically-
based variation across schools in terms of curriculum, pedagogy, and various other aspects
of the educational experience. Troublingly, a range of previous studies have found evidence
that increased school autonomy yields improved student outcomes (Clark 2009; Fuchs
and Wößmann 2007; Gibbons, Machin, and Silva 2008; Hanushek, Link, and Wößmann
2011; Wößmann 2003), and early evidence suggests that Academization may follow this
pattern (Machin and Vernoit 2012). Furthermore, anecdotal evidence from interviewed head
teachers suggests that the financial benefits to schools of conversion were large at the outset
of the scheme, but have since declined markedly. If that is true, then the way the policy
has developed, by design or otherwise, will have led to a financial rebalancing in favour of
schools in Conservative (and Liberal Democrat) constituencies. Data are not yet available
to assess this possibility, but it constitutes an important avenue for further research. Thus,
regarding the distribution of both student outcomes and school-level funding, there appear
to be important avenues for further research.
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